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The 1958 Constitution is France’s fifteenth since the Great Revolution.  Over two 
centuries of turmoil and change, one feature of French constitutionalism remained 
remarkably stable: the sovereignty of la Loi within the juridical order.  In the Republican 
tradition, Parliamentary acts were understood to incarnate la Volonté générale, and la 
Volonté générale comprised its own higher law ideology.  Separation of powers doctrines 
subjugated the courts to legislative authority, prohibiting the judicial review of statutes.  
Under the Fifth Republic, Parliament lost its centrality, but legislative sovereignty 
remained intact in an important formal sense.  Statutes could only enter into force with 
the consent of Parliament and, once promulgated, no law could be challenged before a 
judge.  On July 22, 2008, legislative sovereignty died a painless death, when Deputies 
and Senators gave the Conseil constitutionnel the power to review the constitutionality of 
laws on the books, in collaboration with the Cour de cassation and the Conseil d’état.  
The Council will now become a bonafide member of the family of European 
constitutional courts. 
 
The 2008 constitutional revision completes the “transformation”1 of the Fifth 
Republic, a process initiated by the Council’s 1971 “freedom of association” decision.2  
The political parties have, in effect, ratified the “juridical coup d’état” that took place 
when the Council successfully incorporated a charter of rights into the Constitution.3  In 
this brief article, I examine the effects of this transformation on the exercise of legislative 
and judicial power, focusing on the authority of the Council within the constitutional 
order.  Looking ahead, the 2008 revision will open a new phase in the evolution of the 
Fifth Republic, one of pluralism and fragmented authority in the process of protecting 
and developing fundamental rights. 
 
I The Council and Legislative Power 
 
The founders of the Fifth Republic gave the Council veto powers, within 
legislative processes, in order to secure the executive’s dominance over Parliament and 
the production of la Loi.  The Council’s role fundamentally changed when its rights 
jurisprudence combined with the 1974 constitutional revision (granting the saisine to the 
Opposition) to enhance the political system’s capacity to generate constitutional disputes.  
The target of control would no longer be the Parliament, per se, but the legislative agenda 
of the Government and its Majority.  During the crucial 1974-88 period, successive 
Oppositions activated the Council, with increasing fervor, and the Council reacted by 
developing an increasingly sophisticated jurisprudence. 
 
                                                 
1 For a theory of juridical “transformation,” and its application to France, see Alec Stone Sweet, 
“Judicialization and the Construction of Governance,” Comparative Political Studies 31 (1999): 147-84. 
2 Décision 71-44, Recueil des décisions du Conseil constitutionnel (1971): 29. 
3 Alec Stone Sweet, “The Juridical Coup d’État and the Problem of Authority,” 8 The German Law Review 
10 (2007): 915-28. 
My approach to the study of the Council4 – and all European constitutional 
courts5 – is based on a simple two-part thesis.  First, when the Council exercises abstract 
review powers, it operates as a specialized legislative chamber.  Second, whenever 
Parliament debates and takes formal decisions on the constitutionality of projets de loi, it 
behaves as a kind of constitutional judge. 
 
A. The Council as a Specialized Legislative Chamber 
 
The Council’s legislative powers have thus far been limited to the abstract review 
of laws adopted by Parliament, prior to their promulgation, upon referral by politicians.   
Typically, it is the Opposition that activates the Council.  Parliamentary minorities are 
attracted to the Council because it is the only stable “veto point” in the legislative 
process.  Referrals lengthen this process, adding another stage: a final, "constitutional 
reading" of the law by the Council.  We thus have good reason to conceptualize the 
Council as a specialized legislative chamber (“specialized” because its work is 
meaningfully restricted to decisions about constitutionality.) 
 
In my research, I traced every law adopted during the 1974-88 period through 
each stage of the legislative process in order to assess the influence of the Council and its 
jurisprudence on the work of the Government and Parliament.6  The Council’s impact 
proved to be profound and multi-dimensional.  In annulling legislative provisions (which 
it did in more than half of its decisions during this period), the Council functions, in 
Kelsen’s terminology, as a “negative legislator.”7  The authority to veto and to amend 
statutes comprises only one dimension – immediate and negative – of the Council’s 
impact.  The Council’s legislative power also extends to a second dimension: prospective 
and creative.  When the Council lays down strict réserves d’interprétation, it rewrites, or 
amends, legislation, to the extent that its interpretation meaningfully differs from that of 
the government and the majority.  When ministers and parliamentarians draft, revise, and 
repeal laws in order (1) to comply with the Council’s jurisprudence, or (2) to anticipate 
the direction of future Council decisions, they ratify the pedagogical authority of the 
Council within the legislative process.  In the 1980s, the Council emerged as a powerful 
“positive legislator,” and a new “constitutional politics”8 institutionalized.  In these 
politics, legislators take decisions in light of the Council’s jurisprudence, and in the 
“shadow” of the saisine.  By the end of the period, it was no longer possible for an 
                                                 
4 Alec Stone, The Birth of Judicial Politics in France: The Constitutional Council in Comparative 
Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).  
5 The thesis has also been applied to the constitutional courts of Central and Eastern Europe, see Wojciech 
Sadurski, (2005), Rights Before Courts: A Study of Constitutional Courts in Postcommunist States of 
Central And Eastern Europe (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers). 
6 The Birth of Judicial Politics in France, op cit. 
7 For a discussion of Kelsen’s distinction between the positive and negative legislator as applied to the 
Council and other constitutional courts, see Alec Stone Sweet, “The Politics of Constitutional Review in 
France and Europe,” International Journal of Constitutional Law 5 (2007), pp. 69-92, and Alec Stone 
Sweet, "Constitutional Courts and Parliamentary Democracy,” West European Politics 25 (2002), pp. 77-
100. 
8 Alec Stone Sweet, "La politique constitutionnelle," in B. François and R. Drago, eds., La légitimité de la 
jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnel (Paris: Economica, 1999), pp. 117-40. 
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observer to understand how French law was made without paying close attention to how 
the Council interacts with the legislator. 
 
B. Parliament as a Constitutional Judge 
 
After the 1971 decision, la Doctrine gradually abandoned its hostility to the 
Council.  A consensus emerged to the effect that the Council constituted a “jurisdiction” 
worthy of doctrinal respect and attention because it produced an authoritative 
jurisprudence on the legality of Parliamentary acts.9  It is now forgotten that, during the 
Third Republic, jurists used virtually identical arguments to claim that Parliament 
functioned as a constitutional judge whenever it debated the lawfulness of its own 
activities, under the quéstion préalable procedure.10  In the Fifth Republic, this argument 
is much stronger.  Under the standing orders of the Assembly and Senate, deputies and 
senators may raise a motion d’irrecevabilité, which require them to debate and vote on a 
bill's constitutionality.  During these debates, they cite constitutional texts, invoke legal 
scholarship, and rehearse relevant Council jurisprudence.  If the motion passes, the bill is 
rejected as unconstitutional.  From 1981 through 1987, the National Assembly alone 
debated and voted on 94 such motions, a figure to be compared with 93 Council 
decisions.  The standard arguments of French doctrine compel us to conclude that the 
Assembly, not the Council, was the more active constitutional judge. 
 
Parliamentarians, too, have thought of themselves as constitutional judges, and of 
the Council as a legislative chamber.  Debating a motion of irrecevabilité against the 
Socialists’ Nationalisation bill in 1981, the Vice-President of the Senate declared that 
Parliamentarians were judges of the first instance, under the control of the Council, just 
as trial judges are controlled by the Cour de cassation.11  One parliamentary supporter of 
the Council, writing in the Revue politique et parlementaire in 1986, described the 
Council as a “chamber of appeal” for Parliament, or a “second parliament” that organizes 
the work of the “first parliament."12  Later that same year, an unhappy Jacques Toubon 
called the Council "a parliament of judges."13
 
My thesis is not meant to provoke controversy.  It is meant to describe a reality, 
and this reality is not limited to the French case.  On the contrary, the more any 
constitutional court exercises abstract review powers in a minimally effective manner, the 
more the legislator will be induced to behave as a constitutional judge. 
 
 
II The Council and Judicial Power 
 
                                                 
9  The Birth of Judicial Politics in France, op cit., chapter 4.   
10 Marcel Waline, “Eléments d'une théorie de la jurisdiction constitutionnelle,” Revue du droit public 45 
(1928), pp. 441-62. 
11 Etienne Dailly, Debats, Senate, 20 novembre 1981. 
12 Pierre Pascallon, "Le Conseil constitutionnel: un deuxième parlement," Revue politique et parlementaire 
925 (1986), p. 3. 
13 Le Monde, 5 Septembre 1986. 
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The founders of the Fifth Republic explicitly opposed the creation of a 
constitutional court.  In 1958, during the Travaux préparatoires, they rejected the 
proposal of the Comite consultatif constitutionnel to permit the Cour de cassation and the 
Conseil d’état to refer laws to the Council for a ruling on their conformity with the new 
constitution.  They also refused to grant the Council jurisdiction over fundamental rights.  
To decide otherwise, Michel Debré and Raymond Janot insisted repeatedly, would be to 
establish a “government of judges.”14
 
When the Council began behaving as if it were a constitutional court, it inevitably 
raised questions about the nature and scope of its authority.  The orthodox presumption in 
Europe is that constitutional courts hold – or ought to hold – the ultimate authority to 
determine how constitutional norms are to be interpreted and applied.  Further, the 
decisions of the constitutional judge are – or ought to be – binding on every other organ 
and actor in the system.  In France, however, the Council’s capacity to determine how the 
Constitution and rights will evolve cannot be presumed. 
 
A.  Problems of Authority 
 
The Council’s authority within legislative space is virtually perfect, to the extent 
that the Opposition acts as its agent, or “watchdog.”  The Council exercises legislative 
powers that are both negative and positive, often simultaneously.  When the Council 
annuls an important legislative reform, it typically provides guidance as to how le projet 
should have been elaborated in the first place.  Such decisions provoke a "corrective 
revision" process:  the Government redrafts the censured text, in conformity with 
constitutional jurisprudence, in order to secure promulgation.  In such processes, the 
Council has already made its legislative choices explicit, and the Government’s 
compliance with the Council’s decision is assured by the threat of a second referral by the 
Opposition.  The threat of referral comprises a (coercive) mechanism of compliance.15
 
In comparison, the Council’s authority within judicial space is quite imperfect, 
precisely because no watchdog, or any other coercive mechanism of compliance with its 
jurisprudence, exists.  Famously, or notoriously, the Conseil d’état and the Cour de cassation 
long refused to recognize the authority of the Council’s reasoning.  This situation became a 
problem during the 1980s, when the Council began issuing réserves strictes d’interprétation.  
The Council, supported by constitutional doctrine, insisted that its réserves d’interprétation 
were binding on all public authorities, judges in particular; to allow otherwise would be to 
permit a law to be enforced in an unconstitutional way. 
 
The authority problem is obvious: the Council relies on the judiciary to enforce its 
positions, but it had not means to compel the courts to do so.  Initially, the courts were hostile 
                                                 
14 Travaux préparatoires de la Constitution du 4 octobre 1958, Avis et débats du Comité consultatif 
constitutionnel (Paris: Documentation francaise, 1960), pp. 75-79, 101-102, 164-166 ; Documents pour 
servir à l'histoire de l'elaboration de la Constitution du 4 octobre 1958, tome 1: Des origines de la loi 
constitutionnelle du 3 juin 1958  l'avant-projet du 29 juillet 1958 (Paris: Documentation francaise, 1987) 
pp. 388, 425.  
15 Unless the political parties are able and willing to revise the Constitution in order to reverse the Council’s 
decision, the Council will normally have le dernier mot. 
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to the idea of being placed under the Council’s tutelage.  In 1993, l’Association 
Professionnelle des Magistrats even released a Communiqué calling on judges and 
prosecutors to ignore binding interpretations, which they characterized as “trivial” gloss.16  
By the end of the 1990s (at the latest), senior judges on the Cour de cassation and the 
Conseil d’état had made the choice to accept the “persuasive authority” of the Council’s 
interpretations.  In my view, it was virtually costless for them to do so, at this point in time, 
given that the two supreme courts had already succeeded in asserting their own autonomous 
authority to protect rights, both under the Constitution17 and under the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR).  In this context, the Council’s réserves expand (rather than 
restrict) the menu of interpretive options available to the supreme courts. 
 
B.  Constitutional Pluralism and Problems of Authority 
 
In 1975, the Council made a massive strategic error: it declared that the ECHR fell 
outside the scope of its jurisdiction.18  The Convention was eventually incorporated into 
French law with a status superior to la Loi; and the two supreme courts gradually began to 
enforce it in order (1) to defend themselves against censure at the hands of the Strasbourg 
court, and (2) to develop and consolidate new powers of judicial review.19  Simplifying a 
complex process, over the past fifteen years, the Cour de cassation and the Conseil d’état 
became de facto constitutional judges.  They authoritatively construct and apply both 
constitutional rights and the Convention, and they do so beyond the reach of the Council’s – 
and the legislator’s – control.  Significantly, if litigants are going to plead rights against a 
statute before the courts, they are much more likely to plead the Convention than they are to 
plead the French constitution – which advantages the supreme courts, not the Council. 
 
Today, the French legal order is characterized by a strong form of constitutional 
pluralism: multiple high courts exercise autonomous authority to develop and protect 
fundamental rights, and these rights are found in multiple sources of law (written, unwritten, 
French, European).  In the German and Spanish systems, the constitutional complaint (the 
Verfassungsbeschwerde and the amparo) constitutes a relatively effective mechanism for 
ensuring the constitutional court’s authority.  With individuals acting as the watchdogs, 
constitutional courts are able to supervise how the judiciary interprets and enforces the 
ECHR, and they are able to determine if and how the constitutional order will adapt to the 
jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court.  The Council has no means of controlling how the 
Cour de cassation and the Conseil d’état apply the Convention.  Further, each of the two 
                                                 
16  Le Monde, 9 August 1993. 
17 By the end of the 1980s, both supreme courts were in the process of learning how to interpret and use 
constitutional rights, for their own purposes, in ways that could not be derived from the Council’s 
jurisprudence.  See Governing with Judges, op cit., pp. 122-124.  
18 Décision 74-54 DC, Recueil des décisions du Conseil constitutionnel (1975): 19. 
19 The theory of la Loi-écran could not co-exist with the notion of the supremacy of EC/EU law in 
domestic systems; and the evolution of the Strasbourg system (especially after the entry into force of 
Protocol No. 11), increasingly exposed the French system of rights protection as indefensible and 
inadequate.  See Elisabeth Lambert Abdelgawad and Anne Weber, “The Reception Process in France and 
Germany,” in A. Stone Sweet and H. Keller, eds., A Europe of Rights: The Impact of the ECHR on 
National Legal Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 107-64; Mitchell Lasser, “The European 
Pasteurization of French Law,” 90 Cornell Law Review (2005), pp. 995-1083. 
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supreme courts now perform the task – an inherently constitutional task – of determining 
how constitutional rights and Convention rights will be coordinated with one another.  A 
steady stream of cases provides them with opportunities to modify or reinforce their 
positions, on a continuous basis.  The Council will either reverse its 1975 jurisprudence, or 
be increasingly marginalized. 
 
Finally, the 2008 constitutional revision introduces a form of concrete review 
(l'exception d'inconstitutionnalité) into France, which is likely to complicate matters further.  
The reform was justified, in part, as a “modernization” of the legal system, allowing France 
to “catch up” with its European neighbors.  Here again, a comparative perspective is 
instructive.20  In Spain and Germany, individuals can appeal directly to the constitutional 
judge when the ordinary courts either fail to refer matters to the constitutional court, or when 
they fail to apply its jurisprudence properly.  In Italy, where there is no amparo mechanism, 
the Corte Costituzionale’s authority depends on its ability to negotiate a cooperative 
relationship with the Corte di Cassazione and the Consiglio di Stato.  Cooperation is not 
guaranteed; indeed, “wars of judges,” large and small, periodically break out.  The French 
Council now faces an Italian-style situation.  In my view, the l'exception 
d'inconstitutionnalité is likely to accentuate, rather than reduce, constitutional pluralism.  
How the new procedure will operate will be determined more by inter-court diplomacy than 




In 1958, the founders of the Fifth Republic rejected proposals to provide for 
fundamental rights, for a constitutional court, and for the judicial review of statutes.  
Today, these are core features of French constitutional law. 
 
This article tells this saga, of “the transformation of the Fifth Republic,” in two 
parts. The first focuses attention on the interactions between the Council and the 
legislator, within legislative processes, after the 1971 decision.  French politicians could 
have revised the Constitution in order to purge it of fundamental rights.  Instead, in 1974, 
they extended the power of referral to the Opposition.  The political parties could have 
refused to use the saisine (an illegitimate insult to the formation of la Volonté Générale).  
Instead, when in the minority, both the Left and the Right deployed the saisine in the 
service of their political agendas.  They did so, routinely and without apology, thereby 
legitimating the authority of the Council, and of fundamental rights, within the legislative 
process. 
 
The second part of the saga focuses on the relationship between the Council and 
the courts.  During the critical 1974-88 period, the constitutional politics taking place 
within legislative space fatally undermined the notion that la Loi was “sacred” and 
immune to external control.  Gradually, the courts began to interpret and apply 
constitutional rights on their own, for their own jurisprudential purposes.  As important, 
the development of European law created new opportunities for the two supreme courts 
to redefine themselves as de facto constitutional jurisdictions.  The constitutional order 
                                                 
20 See Governing with Judges, op cit., chapter 4. 
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now features a plurality of jurisdictions, interpreting and applying multiple of sources of 
higher law.  Parliament is just one of these jurisdictions, and often not the most 
important. 
 
* * * 
 
On July 21, 2008, legislative sovereignty died.  French legislators killed it – an act 
of euthanasia.21
                                                 
21 In 1990 and 1993, similar reforms were blocked by the Senate, and they were opposed by politicians on 
both the Left and the Right.  At the time, some praised legislative sovereignty; some complained that the 
Council’s development of the bloc de constitutionnalité has not been authorized by constituent power; 
some worried about installing a “government of judges.”  In 2008, no one bothered to raise any of these 
objections.  Legislative sovereignty died without a bang, or even a whimper. 
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